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Abstract
According to the theory of artifi cial intelligence (AI), the human mind is a 
formal system made of symbols that operate following a set of instructions, 
which allow the manipulation of symbols according to their physical form. 
Against the conception that mental states and processes can be defi ned only 
from a syntactic perspective, John Searle used the Chinese Room thought 
experiment by which he intended to demonstrate that the human mind is 
more than a formal structure, having a semantic content as well. The semantic 
content of the human mind is given by intentionality, a feature that belongs 
exclusively to biological organisms. Starting from here, Searle shows that the 
logical structure of intentionality and the conditions for functioning of the 
intentional states cannot be explained by the computational approach of the 
human mind. Another perspective, which invalidated the AI theory, belongs 
to Hubert Dreyfus who considers that an adequate understanding of the 
human mind needs to start from the understanding of the phenomenological 
structures by means of which we relate to the world. Therefore, cognition and 
intentionality are explained from the perspective of an embodied being that, 
due to his body skills, is ontologically and dynamically coupled to the world. 
In this case, it is not the biological dimension of the human body that matters, 
but the phenomenological one that does not treat intentionality as knowing-
that, whose role is to grasp the world’s objective features, but as a way of 
constituting the world of the subject according to his concerns and interests.
Key words: AI theory, intentionality, logical analysis, phenomenology, 
background, context.
Resumo
De acordo com a teoria da inteligência artifi cial (IA), a mente humana é um sistema 
formal feita de símbolos que operam seguindo um conjunto de instruções, que 
permitem a manipulação de símbolos de acordo com sua forma física. Contra a 
concepção de que estados e processos mentais só podem ser defi nidos a partir de 
uma perspectiva sintática, John Searle usou a experiência do pensamento Quarto 
Chinês pela qual ele pretendia demonstrar que a mente humana é mais do que 
uma estrutura formal, ela também tem um conteúdo semântico. O conteúdo 
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semântico da mente humana é dado pela intencionalidade, um recurso que 
pertence exclusivamente a organismos biológicos. A partir daqui, Searle mostra 
que a estrutura lógica de intencionalidade e as condições de funcionamento dos 
estados intencionais não podem ser explicadas pela abordagem computacional da 
mente humana. Outra perspectiva, que invalidou a teoria IA, pertence a Hubert 
Dreyfus, que considera que uma adequada compreensão da mente humana 
precisa começar a partir da compreensão das estruturas fenomenológicas 
por meio da qual nos relacionamos com o mundo. Portanto, cognição e 
intencionalidade são explicadas a partir da perspectiva de um ser encarnado 
que, devido a suas habilidades corporais, é ontologicamente e dinamicamente 
acoplada ao mundo. Neste caso, não é a dimensão biológica do corpo humano 
o que importa, mas o fenomenológico que não trata intencionalidade como 
sabendo-que, cujo papel é o de compreender características objetivas do mundo, 
mas como uma forma de constituição do mundo do sujeito de acordo com seus 
interesses e preocupações.
Palavras-chave: Teoria IA, intencionalidade, análise lógica, fenomenologia, 
fundo, contexto.
The problems of artificial mind
The classical approach to AI developed by computational theory claimed 
that the human brain is similar to a data processing device and the human mind 
to the software run by this hardware. This conception – which, on the one hand, 
aimed at completing the behaviouristic description of the mind in observable 
input-output terms and, on the other hand, wanted to overcome the dualist mis-
take that transforms the mind into an entity that could not be approached from a 
scientific point of view – relied on the idea that the mind is a formal system made 
of symbols, following a set of instructions whose role is to guide the combination 
of symbols. The instructions were thought to be algorithm-type procedures, which 
allowed the manipulation of symbols according to their physical form. Processing 
symbols by means of syntactic rules used to be thought sufficient to guarantee 
both the transition from premises to conclusion and the semantic coherence of a 
sequence of symbols. The consequence of approaching the human mind from the 
perspective of computational relationships was its transformation into an invari-
ant structure, independent both from the context it operates within and from the 
physical mechanism of producing it.
All these features belong to the conception John Searle called strong AI, which 
distinguishes from the weak AI version by the belief that the human mind can be 
entirely simulated by a computer. While weak AI claims that formal programs are 
just models of the mind, without implying that computers literary have a mind, 
strong AI version endorses that implementing a program designed properly it is 
enough to say that the computer has a mind. Starting from here the researchers 
imagined general mind simulation models, e.g. the Turing machine, and even tests 
that a machine should pass in order to be considered as functioning similarly to the 
human mind. According to the Turing test, if a machine succeeds in performing a 
kind of behaviour, which for an outside observer may not seem different from that 
of a human being, than it is enough to say that such machine has cognitive skills 
as the human one.
Against the conception that mental states and processes can only be de-
fined from the syntactic perspective, John Searle imagined a thought experiment 
that demonstrates that the human mind is not only a formal structure, having 
content as well. The experiment Searle proposed is developed similarly to the 
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Turing behaviouristic test: hence, a person considered to have no knowledge of 
Chinese is locked in a room with a rulebook by means of which s/he can answer 
any question in Chinese. This rulebook is so accurate that it not only contains 
all the answers but the answers it offers “are indistinguishable from those of a 
native Chinese speaker.” (Searle, 1984, p. 32) Therefore, the requirement of the 
Turing test is fully met, i.e., the person in the room behaves as if s/he were a 
highly competent user of Chinese. Similarly, the requirement of a formal system 
is met, the answers being given only following the syntactic rules of the symbols 
used, their meaning remaining totally unknown to the user locked in the room. 
However, this is the starting point of Searle’s objection: nowhere in the process 
of syntactic use of Chinese ideograms occurs the possibility of understanding 
their meaning, i.e., understanding their semantic content. In other words, the 
formal character of computer programs unfolds only syntactic sequences, with-
out the possibility of inferring the interpretation or assignment of meanings to 
symbols thereto. 
What goes for Chinese goes for other forms of cognition as well. Just manipulating 
the symbols is not by itself enough to guarantee cognition, perception, understanding, 
thinking and so forth. And since computers, qua computers, are symbol – manipulating 
devices, merely running the computer program is not enough to guarantee cognition 
(Searle, 1990, p. 26).
The conclusion to the Chinese Room argument, i.e., syntax is not enough to 
found and guarantee semantics, shall be completed by Searle with the observation 
that syntax, just like semantics, are observer-relative notions and not physical features 
intrinsic to the system. The inputs and outputs of a formal system are but mere 
physical items, which acquire their meaning or syntax from an external observer. 
To characterise a system as being computational means to assign a certain feature 
to that system, from the user’s point of view, without indicating thus an essential 
feature of the system.
Starting from here, Searle highlights other weak points of the strong AI con-
ception, e.g., if computational approach is nothing but a matter of interpretation, 
then it cannot become a scientific subject similar to natural sciences. The role of 
natural sciences is to uncover the essential features of the objects and phenomena 
they study, features intrinsic to them and not assigned by an observer. However, com-
putational theory only provides descriptions of some features observer-dependent, 
which means that it cannot be considered a natural science.
Furthermore, starting from the idea that syntax is not a part of physics, but 
it is a feature assigned to physical system by a user, Searle takes again the critique 
with respect to the homunculus character of computationalism. According to the 
homunculus fallacy, a solution to assign intentionality to a formal program is to 
admit the existence of an internal agent to the system, which should possess a 
non-derived intentionality. A variant of this argument is offered by Daniel Dennett 
who imagines a hierarchy of homunculi, where the highest level rests on the lower 
one, made of less and less intelligent homunculi who are lacking more and more 
intentionality, working only following some 0-and-1 handling rules. Thus, the inten-
tion is to rely the system’s intentionality on levels of computation made of more 
and more non-intentional elements. However, according to Searle, an explanation 
in these terms does not demonstrate that the lower homuncular levels are intrinsic 
features to the physical system. To put it differently, “without a homunculus that 
stands outside the recursive decomposition, we do not even have a syntax to oper-
ate with” (Searle, 1992, p. 213).
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Following this line of thinking, Searle shows that a weak point of the compari-
son between a computer and the human mind is that computational processes lack 
causal power. Syntax, or the 1 and 0 sequence characterising computer software, 
does not have its own intentionality which would enable it to cause effects beyond 
its environment. If the human brain is built in such a way that it could consciously 
follow some rules, computers behave as if they followed some rules. Moreover, this 
behaviour is suggested only from the perspective of an external observer. Without 
the existence of the external observer or of the intrinsic intentionality, all that 
remains from the computer and the brain are some patterns, which cannot have 
causal power by themselves. 
One last mistake of the computational approach is that it likens the way the 
brain processes information with the one of a computer. In the case of computers, 
someone from the exterior encodes information that is to be processed, from which 
results an output in a physical form. In the case of the human brain, the neurobio-
logical processes are not observed-dependent, operating with information coming 
from modalities, which benefit from the intrinsic intentionality. Therefore, the bio-
logical level is endowed with a high level of concreteness that cannot be grasped 
by the abstract approach of computer programming in terms of processing some 
symbols. Consequently, it is inadequate to say that the brain processes information 
but rather that “it is a specific biological organ and its specific neurobiological proc-
esses cause specific forms of intentionality” (Searle, 1992, p. 226).
Searle’s conclusion is that formal programs can be neither constitutive nor 
sufficient to produce mental phenomena. This means that the computational ap-
proach, which implies the existence of an intermediate symbolic level between the 
neuronal processes and the intentional states, is wrong. An accurate understanding 
of the human mind implies treating it as a biological phenomenon and understanding 
mental states as a result of brain processes. This goal cannot be achieved without 
understanding intentionality as an intrinsic feature of the human mind and of the 
logical conditions for functioning of the intentional states.
Another perspective contesting the possibility of simulating the human mind 
by AI is phenomenology. According to Hubert Dreyfus, the idea underlying the AI 
theory can be found ever since the ancient beginnings of metaphysics, when logic 
and geometry were invented, which inspired the idea that “all reasoning might be 
reduced to some kind of calculation” (Dreyfus, 1972, p. xv). If Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
conceptions represented mere attempts to put this idea to practice, however insisting 
on the importance of the content of thinking, starting with the Modern Age, the 
approach of thinking in terms of formal rules came to dominate western thought. 
Hence, Galileo, Hobbes or Leibniz started from the idea that the structure of the 
mind is syntactic, trying to find ways of formally approaching thinking which should 
not refer to its semantic content. Such idea was later embraced by mathematicians 
who, apart from trying to discover the laws governing the operations of the mind 
(e.g., George Boole), also began to imagine machines that would operate based 
on logical combinations (e.g., Charles Babbage). From the phenomenological per-
spective, the beginnings of building machines, which, by operating with syntactic 
rules were meant to imitate the human mind, were not only a consequence of the 
technical progress but they also represented a fulfilment of western metaphysics 
that aimed at operating with purely rational thinking, lacking any subjective element.
After the emergence of the theoretical fundamentals of AI, one tried to apply 
it to several problems, regarded as essential for the simulation of the human mind 
at the level of a machine: game playing, language translating, problem solving, 
and pattern recognition. On a general level, showed Dreyfus, the beginnings of AI 
research had two stages: the former was dominated by the interest in Cognitive 
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Simulation, “the use of heuristic programs to simulate human behavior by attempting 
to reproduce the steps by which human beings actually proceed” (Dreyfus, 1972, p. 
xxxxiii). This stage was marked by several significant successes, mainly with respect 
to carrying out simple tasks that did not involve a complex cognitive structure. At 
the same time, the difficulties of approaching the human mind in syntactic terms 
became obvious as such approach became less and less applicable to problem 
solving or game playing in ambiguous contexts or in the case of language transla-
tion dependent on contextual elements which could not be formalized. Hence, it 
was ascertained that natural language is characterized by ambiguity, which can be 
reduced by cues context-dependent which are not necessarily linguistic.  
The latter stage was marked by disappointment as the attempts at approach-
ing complex problems did not yield the results expected. This stage was dedicated 
mainly to semantic processing of information and to developing an artificial intel-
ligence similar to the human mind. Just as in the former stage, the results reached 
led to the conclusion that “human beings do not deal with a mass of isolated facts 
as does a digital computer, and thus do not have to store and retrieve these facts 
by heuristics rules. Judging from their behavior, human beings avoid rather than 
resolve the difficulties confronting workers in Cognitive Simulation and Artificial 
Intelligence by avoiding the discrete information-processing techniques from which 
these difficulties arise” (Dreyfus, 1972, p. 59-60).
Starting from this historical analysis, Dreyfus concluded that the AI theory can 
be summarised as relying on four assumptions: the biological assumption claims the 
structural and functional similarity of the human brain with the computer, in the 
sense that at the neurophysiologic level, our brain operates with information in dis-
crete operations which would correspond to the information units in the computer. 
The psychological assumption reduces reasoning to processing some information 
according to formal rules. This means that human behaviour must be explained 
in terms of an information-processing level, which differs from the neuronal one. 
The epistemological assumption considers that the entire knowledge can be for-
malised and “can be expressed in terms of logical relations, more exactly in terms 
of Boolean functions, the logical calculus which governs the way the bits are related 
according to rules” (Dreyfus, 1972, p. 68). Finally, according to the ontological as-
sumption, all that is essential to the intelligent behaviour can be reduced to a set 
of elements determined independently from any context.
To each of the above assumptions, Dreyfus brings counter arguments, 
which generally rely on highlighting the oversight of man’s phenomenological 
dimension. Hence, against the biological assumption, he shows that the digital 
model described by the classical AI theory is not the only way to process infor-
mation. The brain’s way of processing information is rather analogical, meaning 
that information is processed globally and not by assigning a symbol to every bit 
of information. Moreover, in the case of the brain we should also consider the 
way the cerebral mechanism operates which does not offer arguments for digital 
processing of information.
Against the psychological assumption, Dreyfus shows that the role of psychol-
ogy is not to describe man as a device providing responses to outside inputs fol-
lowing certain rules. This mistake occurs whenever no rigorous distinction operates 
between the neuronal and the phenomenological level, resulting in an intermedi-
ate level that requires explanations in terms of a new vocabulary. Preserving the 
distinction between the two levels removes the intermediate level suggesting that, 
although man can be approached from a physical perspective as a data-processing 
device, his behaviour cannot be explained in these terms but only by considering 
his phenomenological dimension.
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Dreyfus brings arguments against the epistemological assumption from phys-
ics and linguistics. Thus, according to the formal approach, if man as a data pro-
cessing device, is part of the physical world and the physical world follows scientific 
laws that can be grasped in mathematical formulae, then man too is subject to such 
laws. However, this argument relies on the confusion between the physical laws and 
the data-processing rules, considering that the latter are sufficient to guarantee the 
existence of the former. Moreover, there is a difference between the information 
processed by a computer and the information processed by its natural analogous. 
It is not processing the information which is processed by the simulated analogue, 
but entirely different information concerning the physical or chemical properties of 
the analogue. Thus the strong claim that every form of information can be processed 
by a digital computer is misleading. One can only show that for any given type of 
information a digital computer can in principle be programmed to simulate a device 
which can process that information (Dreyfus, 1972, p. 107).
The second argument against the epistemological assumption refers to lan-
guage whose rules cannot be entirely formalised. Apart from grammar rules, which 
can be formalised and simulated by a computer, there are linguistic performance 
rules, as Dreyfus calls them, which cannot be formalised due to two reasons. Firstly, 
because it would mean we are able to systematise our entire knowledge in a gen-
eral theory, which is impossible, and secondly, because not all linguistic rules can 
bear an objective description. This is exemplified by the fact that we are also able 
to understand vague linguistic expressions that do not follow any rules.
In addition, an important argument against both the possibility of formalis-
ing language rules and the ontological assumption of independent primitives is 
the fact that the AI theory does not take into consideration the context a sentence 
is formulated or the context in which the cognitive agent carries out his activity. 
The idea that we can break down knowledge into simple elements, which combine 
themselves following some rules has been present in western philosophy ever since 
Plato. However, such a conception, which transforms knowledge into a sum of 
atomic facts, does not take into consideration the fact that everyday knowledge is 
a kind of situated context-dependent knowledge.
The holistic character of knowledge, highlighted by phenomenology, means 
that we do not know things in isolation but starting from the relationships the new 
objects of knowledge have with other already known objects or human beings. This 
means that human beings have a kind of implicit knowledge of the context they are in 
and this kind of knowledge is an essential condition to understand what is going on in 
the world. Nevertheless, a computer cannot simulate this contextual knowledge; for 
a computer to be able to recognize a context, that computer needs to recognize the 
relevant features of that context. Such a task exceeds the limited capacity of a com-
puter as it assumes formalising the entire human knowledge. Thus, contextualisation 
remains an exclusive feature of the humans owing to their direct coping with the world.
Dreyfus concludes that an adequate understanding of the human mind needs 
to start from understanding the phenomenological structures by means of which 
we relate to the world. Thus, cognition needs to be approached not in terms of 
logical structures but starting from what opens access to the world: the human 
body. Starting from here, we will understand that intentionality is the product of 
dynamic interaction between the body and the environment and that the cognitive 
agent is a situated one, having a direct understanding of the world, which cannot 
be formalised. These features can be grasped only by means of a phenomenologi-
cal approach of the world, to which the computational theory cannot have access.
24
Filosofi a Unisinos, 14(1):18-34, jan/apr 2013
Teodor Negru
Intentionality and Embodiment
The conclusion of the Chinese room thought experiment was that syntactic 
processing of information cannot explain the semantic content of our mind’s mental 
states. According to Searle, the semantic content of the human mind is given by 
intentionality, a feature that belongs exclusively to biological organisms. 
The starting point of Searle’s conception of intentionality is the classical con-
ception that considers intentionality “that feature of mental states by which they 
are directed at or about objects and states of affairs other than themselves” (Searle, 
1999, p. 99). Notwithstanding, Searle means to offer an explanation of intentionality 
which should not transform it into a transcendental phenomenon, as in phenom-
enology, neither reduce it to the causality relationship between different aspects 
of the world tokening symbols in our mind, as it does in the computational theory. 
Intentionality, just like consciousness, is regarded as a biological phenomena, which 
are caused and developed in the structures of the brain. Hence, the only science 
that can offer an explanation to intentionality, and to consciousness, is biology and 
not the computational approaches of the mind or the phenomenological theories.
The mistake of assigning intentionality to formal systems comes from the 
lack of the distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality. Such distinc-
tion is made based on the perception with respect to the existence of two types of 
features of the world: the observer-independent and the observer-dependent ones. 
The intrinsic intentionality belongs to observer-independent features. The biological 
processes in the animal and plant kingdoms, such as mitosis, meiosis or photosyn-
thesis, belong to this category, and so do both the primitive forms of desire, such as 
hunger and thirst, and the higher manifestations of complex biological organisms, 
such as consciousness, intentionality, or mental states. 
The derived intentionality is observer-dependent and is a consequence of the 
mind’s power to offer intentionality to entities that lack their own intentionality by 
assigning conditions of satisfaction, which belong to a certain psychological state. 
Such is the case of language that acquires the capacity of representation from the 
intentional mental states, thus having derived intentionality.
I couldn’t make a statement without expressing a belief or make a promise without 
expressing an intention because the essential condition on the speech act has as 
conditions of satisfaction the same conditions of satisfaction as the expressed Inten-
tional state. So I impose Intentionality on my utterances by intentionality conferring 
on them certain condition of satisfaction which are the conditions of satisfaction of 
certain psychological state (Searle, 1983, p. 28).
Just like language, computer programs have derived intentionality from the 
input used by the programmer. Therefore, the syntactic sequences of formal pro-
grams do nothing but simulate mental states, without operating on the semantic 
dimension, which makes the content of mental states and which is a consequence 
of the mind’s intrinsic intentionality.
The content of intentional states is given by the object or the state of affairs 
in the world the mind is oriented onto. This content displays itself in a certain psy-
chological mode, which represents the way the content relates to the world and 
can take the form of desire, belief, fear, hope, etc. Hence, intentional states are 
regarded as representations, defined not by formal structure but by their proposi-
tional content (e.g., it is warm outside) – which does not necessarily need to be a full 
sentence – presented in a psychological mode (i.e., I believe/hope/assume that it is 
warm outside). As the relation to the world is defined by means of a psychological 
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state, the intentional states have an aspectual shape, which cannot be grasped by 
the computational or functionalist approaches that analyse intentionality in terms 
of representational relationships between the mind and the world.
Furthermore, the intentional states relate the propositional content to the 
world in different ways. In Searle’s terms, this means that they have different direc-
tions of fit: the truth value of the beliefs results from the adequacy between the 
propositional content and the state of affairs in the world. This is why we say that 
they have a mind-to-world direction of fit. Intentions and desires, whose satisfaction 
depends on what is going on in the world, have a world-to-mind direction of fit. 
And there is also another category of intentional acts, like shame and pride, which 
do not attempt to somehow fit to reality, nor do they attempt to fit reality to what 
they express, hence, they have a null direction of fit. 
Where the mental state is responsible for fi tting an independently existing reality, we 
can say that the mental state has the “mind-to-world direction of fi t”, or alternatively, 
it has the “mind-to-world responsability of fi t.” [...] Some intentional states, though 
they have a propositional content, do not have a direction of fi t because it is not their 
aim either to match them (the mind-to-world direction of fi t) or to get reality to match 
them (the world-to-mind direction of fi t). Rather, they take it for granted that the fi t 
already exists (Searle, 1983, p. 168-169).
The direction of fit shows the conditions to be met in order to satisfy an 
intentional state. As we cannot say about all intentional states that they have truth 
values, such as desires, for instance, of which we cannot say whether they are true 
or false, but that they can be fulfilled or not, in the case of intentional states, we will 
speak about conditions of satisfaction. They are a consequence of the propositional 
content of intentional states and of how this content relates to the world by means 
of the direction of fit. Even the states that have a null direction of fit are regarded 
as having conditions of satisfaction by reducing them to states, such as beliefs or 
desires, which have directions of fit and, consequently, conditions of satisfaction. 
This is the reason why Searle considers that intentional states can be interpreted as 
representations of their conditions of satisfaction.
This means that between the content of intentional states and their conditions 
of satisfaction there is a logical connection, which Searle identifies as causality. But 
we cannot speak of causality as in Hume’s interpretation, where the cause is exterior 
to the effect, but in the case of intentional states “the cause is a representation 
of the effect or the effect is a representation of the cause” (Searle, 1999, p. 105). 
Consequently, the structure of such causality is described as self-referential in the 
sense that the conditions of satisfaction refer to that very state in order to fulfil the 
intentional act. Even if this thing is not valid for all the cases of Intentional causa-
tion – as in the case of desires and beliefs, where intention may lead to fulfilling 
an action which is not part of the state, Searle concludes that any intentional state 
“either causes or is caused by its conditions of satisfaction” (Searle, 1983, p. 123). 
Therefore, causality is an essential feature of intentional states which cannot be 
met in the case of computer program. The syntax underlying software development 
is merely formal as there is no content which could determine its causal power by 
determining the conditions of satisfaction.    
Causality is one of the features that make the difference with respect to the 
cognitive science interpretation of the unconscious mental states as well. Accord-
ing to the strong AI conception, computational operations conduct various mental 
processes in an unconscious way. One such example is Noam Chomsky’s theory de-
scribing a universal grammar as some innate set of rules we follow when we learn a 
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language. Agreeing with strong AI, Searle admits that there are unconscious mental 
states, whose role is to constitute the conscious states, but, he adds, the theory of 
cognitive science does not explain how the conscious states cannot be differenti-
ated from the unconscious ones. The unconscious states are actually unconscious 
neurobiological processes that can determine the content of a conscious state. 
Such states should be treated as neurobiological structures behaving as if they had 
intentionality, meaning that they have the power to determine conscious thoughts 
and behaviours, but whose motivational structure remains unknown. 
This does not mean that we should reduce the intentional states to the bio-
logical process of the brain, as the latter, just like the computer programs, do not 
grasp, the aspectual shape by means of which the content of an intentional state is 
presented in a certain manner. Conversely, we should understand the neurobiological 
processes from the perspective of their ability to cause conscious states, a feature 
not to be met with formal programs, characterised merely by syntax. Therefore, 
understanding conscious human behaviour in terms of rule-following is not a sat-
isfactory explanation, as is the case with how a computer operates.
If talk about unconscious rule following is to be taken literally, then such rule fol-
lowing has to have these features: the rule functions causally with the world-to-rule 
direction of fi t and at the rule-to-world direction of causation. The rules have to have 
an aspectual shape, be followed voluntarily, be followed in a way that is subject to 
different interpretations; and they have to be followed in real time. Some postulations 
of unconscious rule following, such as rule following in the performance of speech 
acts, meet these conditions. But many postulations of unconscious rule following, as 
in the cognitive science accounts of visual perception and language acquisition, do 
not meet these conditions (Searle, 2004, p. 256).
The conclusion Searle reaches against computationalism is that intentionality 
is a characteristic feature of a biological system that cannot be replicated by a formal 
program. Thus, Searle objects to the functionalist thesis of multiple realizability, 
which considers that the mind can be created in environments other than the hu-
man brain, as it is only a matter of software. Phenomena such as consciousness or 
intentionality can only appear within a biological organism endowed with a brain 
similar to the human brain. Furthermore, these phenomena are not the result of 
a programmer’s input, but of evolution, which selected those biological traits sig-
nificant for the organism to survive, such as consciousness, whose advantage is to 
coordinate simultaneously a large amount of (intentional) information. 
Contrary to Searle’s approach, which reduces intentionality to merely its logi-
cal conditions for functioning, Dreyfus considers that without a phenomenological 
explanation, man’s relationship with the world continues to remain within the 
framework of a representationist approach, which also characterises the approach 
of mind in terms of the AI theory. Searle’s conception, which refers to searching for 
the conditions of satisfaction of the intentional states, fails on a phenomenological 
level, as the existence of such logical conditions of intentionality also implies their 
representation in the subject’s mind, “i.e., that they must be structures of a conscious 
subject separate from and standing over-against an object” (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 19).
According to Dreyfus, this idea is also supported by Searle’s conception 
regarding the role of mental states in triggering and supporting our actions. For 
a bodily movement to pass as an action, it needs to be accompanied throughout 
its development by a representation of the goal of the action, which should play 
a causal role and which should be known as such by the subject. In other words, 
according to the self-referential causality of the intentional states, the conditions of 
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satisfaction include the requirement that the intention of fulfilling a goal to cause 
the action oriented to that very goal. Such an approach of intentionality is nothing 
but a mentalistic approach of the subject’s relationship with the world, which, again, 
brings up the issue of the ontological difference between the subject and the object.
Against such a conception, Dreyfus resorts to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s 
contributions to the intentionality approach. Both conceptions start from the idea 
that context-independent knowledge, as the one Descartes theorized and which is 
still to be found in the AI approach is not valid for the human being’s everyday situ-
ation. An authentic understanding of how the subject related to the world should 
consider the subject as an active being, which is ontologically situated in a world 
and whose intentionality is characterized by the lack of any intentional content. This 
means that the relationship with the world is not conducted by a representational 
content guiding our intentional states. Similarly, the idea of an extended mind, ac-
cording to which, by means of the mind, man extends his cognitive capacities to the 
world thus achieving a comprehension of the latter, is not supported. Rather, the 
relationship between the cognitive agent and the world is direct implying a skillful 
coping, which is spontaneous and lacks any intrinsic goal.
According to Heidegger intentional content isn’t in the mind, nor in some 3rd realm 
(as it is for Husserl), nor in the world; it isn’t anywhere. It’s an embodied way of being 
towards. Thus for a Heideggerian, all forms of cognitivism externalism presuppose a 
more basic existential externalism where even to speak of “externalism” is misleading 
since such talk presupposes a contrast with the internal. Compared to this genuinely 
Heideggerian view, extended-mind externalism is contrived, trivial and irrelevant 
(Dreyfus, 2009, p. 53).
The conception of Merleau-Ponty, who understands the situated cognitive 
agent as an embodied agent, plays an important role in understanding how this 
everyday coping works. This means that the world of the subject is disclosed by 
his bodily sensory-motor skills. The human body is understood as a lived body by 
means of which we not only obtain the necessary information from the world but 
also enact the world-we-live-in. The world appears thus inseparable from the body 
and it represents an important requirement to constitute the subject’s ipseity.
In so far as, when I refl ect on the essence of subjectivity, I fi nd it bound up with that 
of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence as subjectivity is merely 
one with my existence as a body and with the existence of the world, and because the 
subject that I am, when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world. 
The ontological world and body which we fi nd at the core of the subject are not the world 
or body as idea, but on the one hand the world itself contracted into a comprehensive 
grasp, and on the other the body itself as knowing-body (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 475).
Thus, the Cartesian idea that the mind can function independently from a 
body is invalidated by understanding our cognitive structures as the result of our 
body’s sensory-motor patterns. The body has the role of Husserl’s transcendental 
consciousness of constituting the meaning, but it does no longer act by anticipat-
ing meaning, which would imply the synthesis between form and content, thus also 
implying the existence of a formal rule. If machines can be at best built in such a way 
as to offer an answer by testing some hypotheses, which would have to fit the data 
stored, in the case of the human beings this operation is conducted owing to the 
spontaneous coping-to-the-world skill of the body, which by means of bodily skills 
provides an unlimited set of responses to the environmental changes. Bodily skills do 
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not offer a formal analysis of the response possibilities, but, owing to the body and 
world coupling, they select directly the relevant answer for a certain context, having 
at their disposal an indefinite number of solutions to the problems that may occur.
What makes possible such spontaneous coping is the intentional arc and 
tendency to achieve a maximal grip. Intentional arc means the direct connection 
between the body and the world, conducted at a pre-reflexive level, by means of 
which the world is given directly to consciousness. Intentional arc subtends the 
entire activity of consciousness, pre-constituting the field of experience toward 
which consciousness is oriented.
Let us therefore say rather, borrowing a term from other works, that the life of con-
sciousness—cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life — is subtended by an 
‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us our past, our future, our human set-
ting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being 
situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of 
the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 157).
The existence of the intentional arc, as a basis of immediate experience, is due 
to the body’s acquisition of some skills, which are not representations used to act 
within reality, but rather dispositions by means of which we respond to the situations 
in the world. These embodied skills, which are but developments of some bodily 
predispositions to respond to the changes in the world, open up the world in three 
ways: as a biological environment, as an environment of figurative meanings, or by 
revealing its cultural dimension. In all of these situations, owing to the intentional 
arc, man’s relationship with the world is neutral, but the world is perceived in terms 
of affordances, which help man reach its goals and solve its tasks. 
The other component of the embodied relationship with the world, the 
maximum grip, refers to the fact that by means of this everyday skilful coping with 
the world, one looks for an “optimal body-environment relationship” (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus, 1999, p. 111). Skilful coping does not imply the existence of a goal 
that should constitute the content of an intentional act or that should require its 
mental representation. This is also valid for any skilful action, which should be ap-
proached from the perspective of restoring the equilibrium between the body and 
the world, and not from the perspective of looking for the intention or the goal 
justifying its achievement. The existence of this maximum grip completes the image 
of intentionality without an intentional content Heidegger formulated: the objective 
of intentional states is not to carry out a goal, represented in their content, but to 
achieve the maximum grip on the world. Thus, the tendency toward maximum grip, 
which implies the profound involvement of the body in coping with a situation, 
implies the intentional arc, meaning the development of bodily skills with a view 
to immediately cope with the world changes.
Our body’s spontaneous tendency to reach a state of equilibrium with the 
environment opens the possibility of approaching the mind and world interac-
tion in the nonlinear terms of dynamic systems. This means that the mind is not 
understood based on an input-output scheme, as it was thought in the AI theory, 
which constructs a representation of the world state of affairs from many features 
perceived in the exterior. Such an approach is invalidated by the binding problem, 
i.e., by the difficulty to explain according to what these elements, otherwise sepa-
rated in reality, are bound. The binding problem is solved, or better said, does not 
emerge, if we understand that the answer to what is going on in the environment 
is the result of an ensemble of brain cells that detect a certain affordance starting 
from previous experiences.
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Dreyfus takes, as an example, the theory of the neurobiologist Walter Freeman, 
who describes the functioning of the brain at a given time to have the tendency to 
orient toward a minimum energetic state called attractor. Cerebral states, which tend 
toward the same attractor, form a basin of attraction that occurs with every input 
of the brain, creating thus a landscape attractor. Any new attractor occurring in the 
basin does not have the role of representing an external object, but it activates its 
past experiences with that object. Thus, the brain resonates to the new affordance 
directly without activating a certain representation. This means that it does not react 
to the experience of a physical stimulus (excitation of a sensory organ), but to the 
significance such stimulus has to itself, acquired from past experiences.
The consequence of experimenting new significance of the world is the oc-
currence of a new attractor, which rearranges the basins of attractions in the land-
scape. Hence, the connection with the world achieved by the intentional arc is not 
an invariant structure, based on the understanding of isolated experiences of the 
interaction between the organism and the world. Nevertheless, the intentional arc 
achieves a dynamic coupling with the world by means of which, “each time a new 
significance is encountered, the whole perceptual world of the animal changes so 
that the significance that is directly displayed in the world of the animal is continu-
ally enriched” (Dreyfus, 2009, p. 64).
The dynamic coupling with the world via bodily skills also solves the objection 
raised against the AI theory regarding the way relevant data are selected in a situa-
tion. According to the frame problem, the AI theory fails to explain how a computer, 
which possesses a determinate number of data (the programmer’s input), following 
some rules, can select the requested data needed to solve a task in a certain con-
text. As man is directly engaged in a situation, owing to his skilful coping with the 
world, he has an unmediated knowledge of the information relevant to the context, 
without assuming data processing as in the heuristics of computer software. From 
this perspective, the body is regarded as being characterised by three functions, 
which cannot be simulated or achieved by any computer:
(i) the inner horizon, that is, the partially indeterminate, predelineated anticipation of 
partially indeterminate data (this does not mean the anticipation of some completely 
determinates alternatives, or the anticipation of completely unspecifi ed alternatives, 
which would be the only possible digital implementantation); (ii) the global character 
of this anticipation which determines the meaning of the details it assimilates and is 
determined by them; (iii) the transferability of this anticipation from one sense modal-
ity and one organ of action to another (Dreyfus, 1972, p. 167).
Therefore, cognition and intentionality are no longer reduced to the capacity 
of handling some symbols, independently from any material substratum. However, 
both are thought from the perspective of an embodied being, which by means of 
the bodily skills it is ontologically and dynamically coupled with the world. In this 
case, it is not the biological dimension of the human being that matters, but the 
phenomenological one, the one that treats intentionality not as knowing-that, 
which has the role of grasping the objective features of the world, but as a way to 
constitute the world of the subject according to his concerns and interests. 
Background and contextualization 
To Searle, the consequence of approaching intentionality from the perspective 
of the logical structure of the way to relate to the world has as a result the debate 
on the conditions for functioning of intentional states. To this aim, intentional states 
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are not approached in isolation, functioning separately from the others. Conversely, 
Searle considers that they are conditioning one another creating an interactive 
Network by means of which content and the conditions of satisfaction of every 
intentional state are determined. In other words, the position within the Network is 
an essential requirement to the function of the intentional states as the conditions 
of satisfaction are determined in relation to the Network and not individually by 
each intentional state separately. Therefore, it is not an atomistic approach of the 
intentional states that can explain how the conditions of satisfaction are determined, 
but only a holistic approach.
Integrating intentional states in a Network does not explain how they relate 
to the world. Intentional states do not self-interpret, nor do they apply themselves 
to various situations in the world. Consequently, there is the need to postulate a 
pre-intentional level made of non-representational mental capacities, which do not 
belong to the Network, to carry out coping with the world. These capacities, skills, 
tendencies, dispositions (or more generally, this know-how) that cannot be the 
object of comprehensive research and that share the feature of not being subject 
to analysis in terms of intentional states, create the Background. 
Intentional phenomena such as meanings, understandings, interpretations, beliefs, 
desires, and and experiences only function within a set of Background capacities that 
are not themselves intentional. Another way to state this thesis is to say that all rep-
resentation, whether in language, thought or experience, only suceeds in represent-
ing given a set of nonrepresentational capacities. In my technical jargon, intentional 
phenomena only determine conditions of satisfaction relative to a set of capacities 
that are not themselves intentional. (Searle, 1992, p. 175) 
Approaching the Background in terms of the first order mental states (i.e., 
intentions, desires, etc.), is rather a language game lacking an appropriate vocabulary 
that would grasp its non-intentional and non-representational side, hence, Searle’s 
preference for the use of some terms such as practices, capacities, and stances, 
rather than using a description in terms of assumptions and presuppositions. Such 
an approach would have a representational character by implicitly referring to the 
existence of propositional content, having the truth value and assuming the existence 
of some logical relationships with the conditions of satisfaction. Similarly, the Back-
ground cannot be understood in terms of rules because rules cannot self-interpret 
nor can they self-apply, but they need a Background against which they operate. 
Therefore, the Background is not the consequence of the transcendental 
relationship between the subject and the world, as phenomenology considers, 
but it is the condition of possibility of man’s representing the social and biologi-
cal world. Its content is given, on the one hand, by the capacities all people share, 
as biological beings that belong to the same species (i.e., deep Background). 
On the other hand, its content is given by the local cultural practices influencing the 
individual as a member of a certain society (i.e., local Background). Overall, we can 
say that the Background is a set of enabling pre-intentional conditions by means 
of which our intentional contents can determine various conditions of satisfaction, 
thus describing the world in various ways.
The Background is also an important condition in understanding language. 
Besides syntax, which gives form, language is endowed with semantics as well, given 
by the meanings of the words. However, this is undetermined as words can have 
more meanings or may acquire new meanings depending on the context.  Fixing 
meaning is not a feature of the word in itself, nor is it of the sentence, because, by 
adding words, according to syntactic rules, we only achieve the addition of new 
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indeterminate semantic contents. The consequence of this process would be an 
infinite regress, which perpetuates the issue of semantic indeterminacy.
If representation presupposes a Background, then the Background cannot itself consist 
in representation without generating an infi nite regress. We know that the infi nit regress 
is empirically impossible because human intellectual capacities are fi nite. The sequence 
of cognitive steps in linguistic understanding comes to an end. One the conception pre-
sented here, it does not come to an end with the grasp of semantic content in isolation 
or even with semantic content in isolation or even with semantic content together with 
a set of presupposed beliefs, but rather the semantic content only functions against a 
Background that consists of cultural and biologic know-how, and it is this Background 
know-how which enables us to understand literal meanings (Searle, 1983, p. 148)
Therefore, the issue of determining meaning can only be clarified by the as-
sumption of a Background of capacities and social practices, which has no relation-
ship with language syntax or semantics. This has the role to determine the conditions 
of satisfaction of the sentence, based on which the meaning of the sentence is to 
be determined. Hence, meaning is not a matter that belongs to language syntax, as 
the AI theories used to think, but it is dependent on the context of the utterance, 
i.e., it is fixed against a pre-intentional Background of practices and skills.
Searle’s conclusion is that the Background is a preintentional stance repre-
senting the occurring condition of the intentionality forms from the integrated 
flow of perception and action. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to a finite sequence 
of procedures that can be computer simulated. However, it represents those skills, 
dispositions, states, behaviour, savoire-faire, know-how, etc., which only occur when 
mental states exhibit an intentional content.  
The idea that the groundings of our knowledge have a pre-intentional and non-
representational character, which makes it irreducible to computational operations, 
is also found in Dreyfus. He starts from Heidegger’s conception according to which 
the human being is a being-in-the-world, who relates to the objects around by means 
of various practices. With the help of his actions and practices, man structures the 
situation he is in according to his concerns and interests. This is why he always acts 
in a context whose meaning is already given to him. Therefore, the objects around 
us are not neutral entities whose properties and relationships we mirror by means of 
the mind, but they are contained in a semantic network which involves their holistic 
interpretation. Unlike Searle, to whom the Network is made of the system of propo-
sitional attitudes we have with respect to the world, Heidegger’s understanding of 
the semantic network also contain the knowledgeable subject, who thus has a direct 
knowledge of the ways to solve the problems which occur in different situations.
Human beings are somehow already situated in such a way that what they need in 
order to cope with things is distributed around them where they need it, not packed 
away like a trunk full of objects, or even carefully indexed in a fi ling cabinet. This 
system of relations which makes it possible to discover objects when they are needed 
in our home or our world (Dreyfus, 1972, p. 172).
Furthermore, to Heidegger, the Background is not made of “skills” or “capaci-
ties” that are activated when there is an intentional goal-oriented state, but it occurs as 
a feeling of familiarity with the Dasein to the world around him. This non-intentional 
relationship between the subject and his world is called ontological transcendence 
and it represents the ways in which the Dasein means of action in the world become 
available to him. In other words, the Dasein by its orientation toward various objects 
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does not discover their conditions of satisfaction but it exercises a general skilled 
grasp by means of which the world is disclosed and direct coping becomes possible. 
The conclusion is that all coping, including unready-to-hand coping, takes place on 
the background of this basic non-representational, holistic, absorbed, kind of inten-
tionality, which calls being-in-the-world” (Dreyfus, 2009, p. 56).
This originary situation of the subject is also an important point to differ-
entiate between how man and computer related to the world. The computational 
approach considers the context irrelevant to the data with which a computer oper-
ates. For a computer to be able to respond to a problem, it needs to operate with a 
set of determined data to which it should assign a set of determined values. Unlike 
the computer, man has the possibility of processing holistically the information in 
the world, operating even with undetermined data. This is possible owing to the 
intentional arc and embodied skills by means of which we have direct access both 
to what is going on in the world and to the available solutions to solve our tasks.
In order to highlight the difference between man and computer, Dreyfus 
distinguishes among four types of knowledge: associationistic, formally simple, 
formally complex, and non-formal. The associationistic knowledge includes the 
information acquired by simple associations, which are either innate or learned by 
repetition. The meaning and the context are irrelevant for this type of knowledge, 
which consists in simple procedures, such as decision-making trees, list searching 
or a template, applied to some elementary problems, e.g., memory games, trial 
and error, word-by-word translation, response to rigid patterns. The second type of 
knowledge, i.e., the formally simple one, suits artificial intelligence best, as learning 
is achieved by rules and the procedures applied are algorithm type. The problems 
are fully formalised and measurable and the meaning is explicit, though context-
independent. The next type of knowledge, the formal knowledge, refers to those 
situations which cannot be exhausted by algorithms and which require heuristic 
programs. In this case, learning is achieved by rules and practice and meaning is 
explicit and dependent only on the inner context not on the outer one as well. 
The last type of knowledge, i.e., the non-formal one, includes “all those everyday 
activities in our human world which are regular but not rule governed” (Dreyfus, 
1972, p. 206). This implies that the activity depends on a meaning and a context, 
not explicitly given, and learning is achieved by examples and relies on intuition, 
which cannot be reduced to a set of rules.  
If the first two types of knowledge can be computer-simulated, the third can 
only be partially approached from the computational perspective whereas the fourth is 
specific to humans. This is due to the following three reasons: a computers lacks bodily 
organisation that could provide a global organising level of perception and integration 
of bodily skills; it is impossible for computers to select from a context the aspects relevant 
to the interpretation of the meaning of an utterance; it is impossible for software to 
grasp the context of an action. All these lead to consider issues such as game playing, 
language translation, problem solving, and pattern recognition human-specific as they 
pertain to man’s direct relationship with the world. Dreyfus’ conclusion is that man’s 
feature to be a being-in-a-world, i.e., an embodied being that is originary in a situa-
tion, cannot be expressed in computational terms, nor can it be computer-simulated.
Conclusion 
Against the computational approach to mind, Searle highlights the biological 
dimension of the human being whose complexity is a result of evolution. Therefore, 
we should analyse man’s essential features as well as their intentionality or con-
sciousness as coping abilities developed throughout the stages of evolution. This 
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means that the answers to the problems related to the nature of consciousness 
and of intentional states should be offered by evolutionist biology, atomic phys-
ics or neurobiology. There is no way phenomenology could solve such problems 
as it rejects any naturalistic approach of the world. Moreover, phenomenology is 
accused of belonging to the foundationalist tradition to the extent that, “Husserl 
is trying to find the conditions of knowledge and certainty, Heidegger is trying to 
find the conditions of intelligibility” (Searle, 2001, p. 89) Searle’s conclusion is that 
phenomenology cannot offer but an incomplete description of how phenomena 
appear to us, and that only logical analysis can explain the structure of intentional-
ity, as a biological phenomenon, and the conditions of possibility of our practices.
Starting from the positions of phenomenology, Dreyfus shows that it is not 
enough to consider man only as a biological being, but we need to understand that 
one of man’s essential features is given by his special relationship with the world. 
This relationship cannot be grasped within the representational terms of the logical 
analysis of phenomena, which 
as an account of all human intentional behaviour and all functional stuff in the world, 
it is simply false because it ignores a more basic form of intentionality – ongoing 
coping – that makes this propositional form of intentionality possible, and a kind of 
comportament – background coping – the enables one to fi nd one’s way about in 
the world (Dreyfus, 2001, p. 336-337).
Similarly, approaching man and world relationship in the input - output 
procedural terms, does not offer a satisfying explanation of man coping with the 
world due to the direct experience of his bodily skills that achieve spontaneous 
knowledge of the environment he lives in. Consequently, it is only with the help of 
phenomenology that we can grasp the non-propositional dimension resulting from 
the dynamic interaction between the body and the environment, which cannot be 
formalised and which will never be able to be processed by a computer.
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